Powers of the Sovereign

Powers of the self-directed1(a) Powers of the SovereignUnder the (unwritten) constitution of the joined Kingdom, all actions of establishment are undertaken in the name of the Crown. According to Joseph ChittyThe rights of sovereignty, or supreme magnate, are of a legislative and executive nature, and must, under all form of government, be vested exclusively in a body or bodies, distinct from the people at macro 1820, p.2.The male monarch is therefore part of the legislature which consists of the Crown and the tolerates of headmasters and Commons. Further, while it was conventional by the Case of Proclamations (1611), the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Case of Prohibitions (1607) that the monarch has no role to make legalitys or act in a judicial capacity, the broad(a) administration of justice is conducted in the name of the Queen. In addition, much of government is conducted by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative including the power to declare was and come to into treati es with foreign states. The Queen alone has the power to dissolve Parliament, appoint ministers and accede to bills.Therefore it may be conclude that although frequently dismissed as a titular head of state, the Queen continues to exercise considerable power within what is in all other respects a rightfully parliamentary democracy.1(b) C one timern at the Constitutional Position of the MonarchThis dichotomy between the get out of the people as expressed through their elect representatives in Parliament and the residual power vested in the Queen who turn out the throne solely on the basis of hereditary entitlement inevitably gives make grow to concern as to the potential for misuse of sovereign power.Typically, Queen capital of Seychelles retained the view that she had the ability to dissolve Parliament against the customary advice of her ministers. In the Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd series, Vol II, pp.297-99, Lord Salisbury warned of the potentially pitch-black consequen ces of much(prenominal) a step with the dismissed party then having to go to the country as opponents of the Crown. In reality, constitutional convention dictates that such a step would never be undertaken. It is as unthinkable as the Queen refusing Royal Assent to an Act of Parliament. Similarly, the House of Lords made it clear in Council of Civil attend to Unions v Minister of State for Civil Service (1985) the case in which the prerogative power to withdraw trade magnetic north rights from employees at GCHQ was challenged (albeit unsuccessfully) that the hooks retained the right to review the exercise of prerogative power. and then it may be concluded that while constitutional concerns must make up in theory as to the manner in which the Queen top executive exercise her power, the reality is that she regards herself as being prevented by convention from so doing.2) The European Communities Act 1972Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 providesAll such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising under the Treatiesare without further edict to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in lawemphasis supplied.The issue of what will happen if a domestic canon is uneven with directly useful Community obligations is specifically addressed by s.2(4)any enactment passed or to be passed by the Westminster Parliamentshall be construed and have effect pendant to the foregoing provisions of this section.Initially, the response of the courts to these provisions was ambivalent. In Felixstowe Dock and railroad line Co v British Transport Docks Board (1976), Lord Denning ventured that once a Bill is passed by Parliament and becomes a statute, that disposes of all sermon about the Treaty. These courts will then have to abide by statute without regard to the Treaty at all. However, in McCarthys Ltd v Smith (1979), Lord Denning appeared to retreat from this positionIn construing our statute, we are entitled to look at the Treaty as an aid to its construction and even more, not plainly as an aid but an overriding force.In Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd (1983), Lord Diplock expressed the view that anything goldbrick of an express statement in a statute that it was intended to be in breach of Community Law would not justify a UK court in finding an inconsistency. However, in Factortame (No.1) (1989) the House of Lords refused to grant retardation relief to restrain the operation of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 on the basis of s.2(4) of the 1972 Act. This was however overturned by the European Court of justice and led to the decision in Factortame (No.2) (1991) in which Lord Bridge concludedUnder the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a UK court when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community la w.In Duke v Reliance Systems Ltd (1988) the House of Lords had to consider whether the different retirement ages for men and women in this country was in breach of the Equal Treatment Directive. It was argued that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 should be construed so as to conform with the Directive. Lord Templeman arguedA British court will always be willing and anxious to conclude that United Kingdom law is consistent with Community law. Where an Act is passed for the purpose of giving effect to an obligation imposed by a directive or other instrument a British Court will rarely encounter ay difficulty in concluding that the language of the Act is effective for the intended purpose.It may be concluded therefore that despite the initial misgivings described above, the approach of the British courts has been to ensure that European Law will always prevail over inconsistent domestic law by virtue of the operation of the European Communities Act 1972. As will be observed, this has on occasion given rise to a certain grade of mental judicial gymnastics where the statute appears to be inconsistent on its face but the courts have strained to impose an interpretation that will allow at least the pretence of consistency.